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Abstract
Most of the recent efforts addressing the issue of
privacy have focused on devising algorithms for the
anonym ization and diversification of data . Our
objective is upstream ofthese works: we are concerned
with privacy diagnosis. In this paper. we start by
investigating the issue of k-anonymity. We propose
algorithms to explore various questions about k-
anonymity of data . Such questions are. for instance.
"is my data sufficiently anonymous? ", "which
information. if available from an outside source,
threatens the anonymity ofmy data ? " In this paper we
focus on anonymity and, in particular, k-anonymity.
The algorithms that we propose leverage two
properties of k-anonymity that we express in the form
of two lemmas. The first lemma is a monotonicity
property that enables LIS to adapt the a-priori
algorithm for k-anonymity . The second lemma is a
determinism property that enables us to devise an
efficient algorithm for &suppression. We illustrate and
empirically analyze the performance of the proposed
algorithms.
1. Introduction
Privacy pre servation ought to become a major
concern for organizations and individuals publishing
data. Organizations and professionals publish
operational data to en sure business visibility and
effective presence on the World Wide Web.
Individuals publish personal data in the hope of
becoming socially visible and attractive in the new
electronic communication forums. As a result, large
amounts of data, high level of details and the numerous
sources are publically available.
Consequently, even though data may locally seem
to respect privacy, cross referencing with external data
and statistical inferences can disclose more than
intended. For instance, while data publishers generally
remove direct identifiers such as names, social security
numbers, full addresses (a process referred to as de-
identification) cross referencing and quasi-identifiers
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allow identification of individuals. In her seminal work
[I], Latanya Sweeney strikingly illustrated her thesis
by showing that she could retrieve the medical record
of the governor of Massachusetts from publicly
available and supposedly anonymous data.
Privacy preservation involves controlling
anonymity and diversity of published data to prevent
cro ss-referencing and inferences while maintaining
sufficient usefulness. While anonymity prevents
identity of individuals from being revealed in
published data, diversity prevents unwanted disclosure
of sensitive information . Anonymity and diversity are
quantified by such notions as k-anonyrnity [I]. 1-
diversity [2], (a,k)-anonymity [3] and t-closeness [4],
for instance.
Processes transforming data (by generalization.
suppression or fragmentation, for instance) to achieve
required levels of anonymity and diversity are called
anonymization and diversification, respectively. Most
of the recent efforts addressing the issue of privacy
have focused on anonymization and diversification.
Fewer efforts have been made to devi se techniques.
tools and methodologies that assist data publishers,
managers and analysts in their investigation and
evaluation of privacy risks. We propose the idea of a
one-stop privacy diagnosis centre that offers the
necessary algorithms for the exploratory analysis of the
data and of various publication scenarios. Such a
diagnosis centre should assi st answering questions
such as "is my data anonymous?", "is my data
sufficiently diverse?" and "which information, if
available from an outside source, threatens the
anonymity of my data?"
In this paper, as a first step towards a privacy
diagnosis centre, we focus on anonymity diagnosis.
More specifically, we propose algorithms for the
diagnosis of k-anonymity for relational data. We also
con sider the diagnosis of k-anonymity with 0-
suppression. We first prove a monotonicity property of
k-anonymity and leverage it to de vise algorithms as a
variant of the a-priori algorithm of [5]. We prove a
determinism property of O-suppression to devise
efficient algorithms when considering tuple
suppression.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
section 2 we survey some state of the art related works
with a focus on k-anonymity. In section 3, we give our
working definitions for k-anonymity and 0-
suppression. In section 4, we present the prototypical
questions that our diagnosis centre can answer and
propose the corresponding algorithms. In section 5, we
illustrate and empirically analyze the performance of
the proposed algorithms. Finally, we conclude our
discussion in section 6 with some directions for future
work.
2. Literature review
k-anonymization was first introduced and proposed
by Samarati and Sweeney [1, 6] as a model for
protecting privacy. They noticed the existence of
quasi-identifiers, i.e. sets of attributes that can be
cross-referenced in other sources and reveal identity.
In their approach, data privacy is guaranteed by
ensuring that any record in the released data is
indistinguishable from at least (k-I) other records with
respect to the quasi-identifier. That is each equivalence
class (the set of tuples with the same values for the
attribute in the quasi identifier) has at least k tuples. An
individual is hidden in a crowd of size k, thus the name
is k-anonyrnity.
Most of the works on k-anonymity concerns k-
anonymization [I, 6-15]. Sweeney [9] proposes
generalization and suppression. With generalization the
value of an attribute is changed to a "less specific but
semantically consistent value" [9]. For instance age is
changed to an age range. Suppression can be applied to
values or instances. With value suppression a value is
not released, for instance replaced by a special value
(e.g. ""), With instance suppression instances are
removed. For instance, selected tuples of a table are not
published. We use a notion of o-suppressed subset
adapt~d from ~6, 10, 14]. Usefulness or quality of the
resulting data IS measured by information loss metrics
which we do not discuss here.
Lefev:e et al. [14] use full-domain generalization,
one specificversion of global recoding proposed in [9],
as the receding model for generalization. In addition to
generalization they use tuple suppression by removing
a certam numbe.r of. outliers to improve the quality.
They prove that If Q IS a subset of attributes in table T
and T is k-anonymous with respect to Q then T is k-
anonymous with respect any subset of Q (notice that
we will adapt a slightly different definition of k-
anonymity a~d reformulate this property in Lemma I).
They use thl.s property to prune their search space
when generating the generalization graph .
. ~hile k-~nonymity is concerned solely with
Identity, I-diversity aims at protecting sensitive
information. It ensures this protection by guaranteeing
that one can not associate an identifier with sensitive
information with a probability larger than 1/1. Many
different notions contributing to privacy, together with
the corresponding transformation processes, have been
introduced that refine anonymity and diversity. For
instance Anatomy [16], (o.kj-anonymityls], [2], [4]
and [7] are some of the proposed methods address this
problem in different perspectives.
Recently authors of [17] have also proposed
anonymity diagnosis algorithms. They are, however,
concerned with fuzzy functional dependencies and
fuzzy quasi-identi fiers (although they don't explicitly
use the term "fuzzy"), while we look at the
conventional [1, 6, 18] notion of quasi identifiers for k-
anonymity.
The monotonicity property of k-anonymity that we
enounce and prove is related and similar to, but
different from the monotonicity/anti-monotonicity
property of anonymization given and proved in [2, 14,
19]. These latter properties are concerned with
generalization/specialization of attribute values, while
our proposal is concerned with adding and removing
attributes in the candidate quasi identifiers.
3. Definitions
Let us present working definitions and the results
that motivate our algorithms.
Definition 1 (Equivalence class with respect to a
set of attributes). Given a multiset instance r of a
relation R I and a set of attributes S c R; t c r is an
equivalence class with respect to S if and only if t is
the multiset of tuples in r that agree on the values of
their attributes in S.
These equivalence classes are the equivalence
classes of the relation on tuples "have the same values
for the attributes in S". The notion suggests the
partitioning of the instances. The notion was
introduced and the name was given in [3, 7].
. Definition 2 (k-anonymity). Given an integer k, an
instance r of a relation is k-anonymous with respect to
S c R if and only if the cardinality of every
equivalence class with respect to S is greater or equal
to k and r is not k+ I anonymous.
This definition of k-anonymity is compatible with
but not identical to definitions given in other papers
such as [I, 7, 9, 14, 15]. This is a recursive definition
that chooses k to be exactly the minimum cardinality
of an equivalence class with respect to S. Without this
recursion ("not k+ 1 anonymous") an instance which is
I R is both the name of a relation and its schema (i.e. a set of
attributes).
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k-anonymous would also be k-I-anonymous.With the
recursive definition it is not the case.
Lemma 1. (Monotonicity). If an instance r of R is
k-anonymous with respect to S, then for any S' such
that ScS'. r is k' -anonymous with respect to S' with k'
s k.
Proof. If I' is k-anonytnous with respect to S. then
the minimum cardinality of every equivalence class
with respect to S is k. For a superset S' of S. every
equivalence class with respect to S· is included ill an
equivalence class with respect to S. This is because the
tuples of an equivalence class ......ith respect to S· agree
on the values of their attributers in S' and therefore
also agree on the values of their attribute in S.
Therefore the minimum cardinality (if the equivalence
classes with respect to S' is less or equal to k.
A consequence of Lemma 1 is that if an instance r
of R is k-anonymous with respect to S, then for any S'
such that S' c S then r is k' -anonymous with respect to
S' with k'·k.
Definition 3 (o-suppression). Given 0 between 0
and I and an instance r of R, r' c r is an o-suppressed
subset of r if and only if the cardinality of r' is the
ceiling of 0 times the cardinality of r. 0 is called the
suppression threshold.
This notion of o-suppressed subset is adapted from [6,
10, 14].
Lemma 2. (Deterministic suppression). Given an
instance r of R, instance r' c r that is obtained by
removing all and entire smallest equivalence classes is
the minimum possible O-suppressed (&0) with the
maximum k-anonymity .
Proof. Constructing a 5suppressed subset consists
in removing some tuple. Removing tuples from each
equivalence class decreases the cardinality of it and
accordingly k value. However the value of k will be
increased. only if all equivalence classes with smallest
size entirely be removed.
(Notice that this lemma can be used iteratively to
approach the desired k-anonymity with minimum
suppression.)
4. Algorithms
Armed with these results, we can now devise
algorithms for privacy diagnosis . Lemma I, the
monotonicity lemma, allows us to adapt the a-priori
algorithm. Lemma 2 allows us to devise a deterministic
strategy for the suppression of tuples.
4.1 What questions can be asked?
A user who wants to publish data from a relation
instance r of R needs to decide of the subset of
attributes S of R that may constitute a quasi-identifier
and needs to evaluate the risk for r. The user wants to
know for which k r is k-anonymous with respect to S.
If the user has no a priori idea of the quasi-identifiers,
he can investigate which subsets S yield dangerous k
values. The user might also be ready to accept some
suppression to protect her data.
In this paper three parameters are considered for
diagnosing anonymity of an instance: k, S, and o.
There are twelve possible questions. The list of
questions is given below.
I. Is r k-anonymous with respect to S?
2. For which k is r k-anonymous with respect to S?
3. For which S is r k-anonymous with respect to S?
4. For which Sand k is r k-anonymous with respect to
S?
5. Is o-suppressed r k-anonymous with respect to S?
6. For which k is o-suppressed r k-anonymous with
respect to S?
7. For which S is o-suppressed r k-anonymous with
respect to S?
8. For which k and S is o-suppressed r k-anonymous
with respect to S?
9. For which 0 is o-suppressed r k-anonymous with
respect to S?
10. For which 0 and S is o-suppressed r k-anonymous
with respect to S?
II. For which 0 and k is O-suppressed r k-anonymous
with respect to S?
12. For which 0, k and S is o-suppressed r k-
anonymous with respect to S?
The questions that consider a given k may be asked
as "is at least k-anonymous" or "is at most k-
anonymous". For o-suppression, we only consider the
question "is at most o-suppressed".
In this paper, we propose algorithms that answer
questions 2, 3 and 6. These algorithms can be adapted
to answer the other questions above.
The reader notices that every algorithm involving
the suppression threshold can also output the actual
tuples to be suppressed. We do not include this
straightforward step in the algorithms presented.
4.2 Measuring k-anonymity given a quasi
identifier S (Question 2)
Given a relation instance r of R and a set of
attributes S c R. we can easily compute k such that r is
k-anonymous with respect to S. This is the minimum
cardinality of equivalence classes with respect to S.
Equivalence classes are obtained by grouping tuples
that agree on the values of S. This trivial algorithm is
the elementary algorithm that is used for some other
questions; hence we give it here for the sake of clarity.
Algorithm I outlines this algorithm .
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Input : r an instance of Rand S c R
Output: k with respect to S
1. rs = projection of r on S
2. min = xc
3. for each distinct value of rs
4. count number of it's similar tuple in c
5. if (c < min) then
6. min", c
7. if (c = 1) then break end if
8. end if
9. end for
10. output min
Algorithm 1. Measuring k-anonymity given S
4.3 Finding the candidate quasi identifiers S that
respect a given minimum k-anonymity (Question 3)
We wish now to find the sets of attributes of R that
satisfy a given minimum k-anonymity for the instance
r of R that we are studying. (An algorithm for the
maximum k-anonymity can easily be derived from the
algorithm that we present in this section.)
An obvious brute force algorithm enumerates the 2"
combinations of attributes of R and computes k for
each of them. However Lemma 1 tells us that if r with
respect to a set of attributes is not k-anonymous then it
is not k-anonymous with respect to any super set of
that set of attributes either. Consequently we consider
subsets only if all their subsets are at least k-
anonymous. Thanks to Lemma 1 we devise a level-
wise algorithm which is similar to the a-priori
algorithm [5] and can achieve significant pruning. The
algorithm output the largest sets of attributes that are at
least k-anonymous. Algorithm 2 outlines details of this
algorithm.
We start from the first level and compute k for each
subset of one attribute. A set is added to the level only
if its K is greater than or equal to the given k (lines 2 to
6). Subsequent levels are processed in the nested loops
of lines 7 to line 25. The nested loops create all sets of
the next level by combining sets of the current level
that differ symmetrically of exactly one element (line
II) (this generation is rather naive for the sake of
clarity and can be easily improved). At line 13 we
check whether all subsets of a candidate exist in the
previous level. If they not all exist, the set can be
pruned. Then we compute K for this candidate set
using Algorithm I (line 14) and add it to next level (N)
only if it satisfies k-anonymity (line 15). Since all
results are not necessarily in the last level, we add
immediate ancestors (super sets in next level) of each
candidate in NN. At line 22 if NN is empty, we add the
current set to final result set (F). When this algorithm
terminates, we have maximum subsets of attributes
such that r is k-anonymous or k' -anonyrnous where k'
> k with respect to them in F and given as output.
Input : r an instance of Rand k
Output: all largest S c R for which r is k-
anonymous or k'-anonymous with k' > k
1. P, N , F = 0
2. for Ai E R do
3. S = {Ad
4. K = (compute K for S using Algorithm 1)
5. if K >= k then P = P U is} §fie if
6. end for
7. while (P <> 0 )
8. for Si E P do
9. NN = 0
10. for s, E P do
11. if Si -Sj and SJ-Si are singleton then
12. S = s, U s,
13. if all subsets of S of cardinality
Isl-1 exist in P then
14. K=(compute K for S using Algorithm 1)
15. if K >= k then
16. N = N U {s}
17. NN = NN U {s}
18. end if
19. end if
20. end if
21. end for
22. if (NN 0) then F F U {Si} end if
23. end for
24. P = N ,N 0
25.end while
26.output F
Algorithm 2. Finding S that respect a minimum (or
maximum) k-anonymity
Using a similar idea we can also measure k-
anonymity for all candidate quasi identifiers (Question
4). Again we exploit Lemma I to prune unnecessary
computing. If r is l-anonyrnous with respect to S then
it is l-anonymous with respect to any superset of S,
then S will be pruned. Because of space limitation we
do not give the details of this algorithm which is
similar to Algorithm 2 above.
4.4 Measuring k-anonymity given a quasi identifier
S and a suppression threshold B(Question 6)
We wish to compute the value of maximum k that
can be obtained by suppressing B (rather B times the
cardinality of the instance) tuples or less. Using
Lemma 2 we infer that in order to achieve maximum k-
anonymity we need only remove entire equivalence
classes of minimum cardinality. Algorithm 3 outlines
the algorithm.
We compute the equivalence classes with respect to
S and their cardinality from line I to 12. We suppress
equivalence classes in ascending order of their
cardinality (line 13 to 18) while the number of
suppressed tuple is less than B(test at line 16).
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Figure 2. Number of calls to algorithm 3 for finding
maximum subsets satisfy k-anonymity (0=0.1)
Suppression removes equivalence cla sses with small
size in order to increase k-anonyrnity exploiting the
determinism of Algorithm 3 as provided by Lemma 2.
Again lemma I help s improve on a nai ve algorithm
that needs to make 256 calls but as one expects the
improvement is less than previous case since by
suppres sion further subse ts satisfy k-anonyrnity and
aren 't pruned. Then number of procedure calls is
increased . The proportion of time related to each call is
300ms in thi s example
Figure 1. Number of calls to Algorithm 1 in
Algorithm 2
We now look at the que stion of finding all
maximum subsets of attributes that respect k-
anonymity with O.l -suppression (Ques tion 7). Figure 2
shows the number of calls to the procedure " Meas uring
k-anonymity for given S with 0=0.1" (Algorithm 3) for
k varying between I and 50 to find maximum subsets
satisfy k-anonymity.
We now evaluate the economy that Algorithm 2 can
achieve by pruning some of the 256 subsets a naive
algorithm would visi t.
Figure 1 shows the number of calls to the procedure
"Measuring k-anonyrnity for given S" (Algorithm I)
for varying values of k from I to 50. We see that e ven
for k as low as 2 we have 23 calls which is less than
10% of the numbers of call s needed for a naive
version . For k=50 there are 9 calls: an economy of
more than 96 %. From run time point of view each
procedure call needs about 90 ms in our run.
5. Performance evaluation
Algorithm 3. Measuring k-anonymity given Sand 0
For answering to Question 7 (maximum subset of
attributes satisfy k-anonymity after suppression) we
use algorithm same as Algorithm 2. Only the
difference is that we call Algorithm 3 instead of
Algorithm I in lines 4, 14. We shall refer to this
algorithm as Algorithm of Question 7.
We now evaluate the performance of our algorithms
with the publicly available Adult data set from the UC
Irvine Machine Learning Repository [20]. It has
become a de facto benchmark for k-anonymization
algorithms. We remove records with missing values as
described and used in [7, II, 15, 21] . The cleaned data
set contains 30165 records. For the sake of simplicity
we keep the following 8 attributes: {age. work cla ss,
education, status , occupation, race, sex , country} .
A Pentium V computer Intel(R) 2.4 GHZ with 1GB
RAM was used to conduct our experiments. Operating
system on the machine was Microsoft Windows XP.
The algorithms were implemented, run and built by
Java, Standard Edition 5.
We focus on the performance evaluation of
Algorithm 2 and its variant incorporating 0-
suppression and finding k-anonymity for all subsets.
We evaluate the efficiency of the algorithms by
counting the numbers of calls to the procedure
" Measuring k-anonymity given S" (Algorithm I) and
"Measuring k-anonymity given Sand 0" (Algorithm
3). We have verified that the curves below are
commensurate to the run time . Instead of showing the
curves for run time, for each curve we give the
proportion of time for each procedure call. We use the
adult data set described above for the following
experiments.
I npu t : r an instance o f R, S c Rand 0
Output : k fo r 8-suppress e d r wi th r e spect to S
1 . rs = pro j ection o f r on S
2 . sort rs a ccording to S
3. define countArray a s list of i n t eg e r s
4 . i = 0
5 . wh i le ( r s )
6. aTuple = rS.next ()
7 . c ount = 1
8 . while (r s . nex t () aTuple )
9 . coun t ++
10. end whi le
11 . count Ar r ay li++l = count
12. end whi le
13 . sor t count Array i n ascending order
14. part ialSum = 0
15. j = 1
16. whil e partialSum < 8 * I r J
17. partialSum += coun t Ar r ay l j++l
18 . end while
19. ou t put countArraylj]
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Now we look at cost for computing k for all subsets
of attributes and different suppre ssion thresholds.
Figure 3 shows number of calls to the procedure
"Measuring k-anonymity for given S with 8"
(Algorithm 3) for varying suppression threshold 8. As
the suppression threshold increases, we need to
consider more combinations of attributes. Too high
suppression create too many candidates and the
performance of the algorithm converges quickly
towards the worst case (naive algorithm) performance.
For this algorithm proportion of time for each
procedure call is 490ms by average .
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Figure 3. Number of calls to Algorithm 3 for finding
k for all subsets for different athresholds
6. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, upstream of anonymization and
diversification algorithms proposed in the recent
literature , we propose the idea of a privacy diagnosis
centre as a library of algorithms for measuring various
notion of privacy such as k-anonyrnity and l-diversity.
We make a concrete step towards this idea by
presenting and evaluating several algorithms for
measuring k-anonymity and k-anonymity with 8-
suppression. We show that efficient algorithms can be
devised thanks to a monotonicity property and a
determinism property.
We are now exploring other metrics , such as 1-
diversity , for evaluating the privacy risk as well as
information loss metrics for evaluating the
consequences of anonymization and diversification.
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